Ethnologically Considered" (1854), Frederick Douglass launched a sustained attack against the mid-century vogue of American ethnology, the scientific school of so-called racial difference. Armed with a theory of multiple creations-polygenesis-the ethnologists offered a new weapon to the arsenal of pro-slavery discourse, one that attempted, in Douglass's words, to "read the Negro out of the human family."4 The theory of polygenesis proved tremendously attractive to pro-slavery theologians, for it sketched a world in which some "human families" were better descended than others. Some could trace themselves back to Adam and Eve, and those who could not were then Biblically
Douglass recognizes, however, that it is not simply "prejudice" that produces faulty science, but prejudice mixed with a misappropriation of Biblical authority. The power of the Bible in the war over the racial past produced one of the central ironies in this debate, since Douglass, through his Christian faith, proceeds from assumptions and goals similar to those of the ethnologists he was debunking. He realizes that the question of the unity of mankind will in part be decided by what "reflects the most glory upon the wisdom, power, and goodness of the Author of all existence." "The credit of the Bible is at stake," he writes, and "the value of that sacred Book ... must be materially affected, by the decision of the question."8 Douglass's allegiance to the Bible puts him in the rather strange company of the Negrophobic Charles Carroll, whose writings were dedicated to proving that the Negro was a "beast." "Inasmuch as my views of the negro were based upon the Bible," Carroll writes, "I realized that it was necessary to show that the scriptures were in absolute harmony with the sciences at every point."9 And though Carroll's goal of a perfect harmony between science and religion might seem overly optimistic, the force of white racism was capable of making the most discordant of notes blend perfectly. In a culture eager to prove the Negro's inferiority and inhumanity, this harmonizing would be less difficult than might be imagined."0
The science we are talking about here was of dubious shape and intention. Ethnology, called by Ephraim Squier in 1849 the "science of the age," was largely a hodgepodge of anthropology, Egyptology, and And yet, the theory of polygenesis that grew out of this science seemed to call into radical question the Mosaic account of creation found in Genesis. How could polygenesis possibly be accepted in a theologically dogmatic society--one like the South, which, for all its interest in the latest scientific theories, always judged those theories against the presumed greater authority of Biblical truth? The tension between science and theology that so concerned Du Bois and Douglass characterized and ultimately shaped much of the debate over racial difference and slavery in the nineteenth century. At issue was a complicated struggle for various forms of sanction and accreditation, as thinkers like Nott, Aggasiz, Morton, and DeGobineau struggled to navigate their way through a maze of conflicting authority. Science and religion became the Scylla and Charybdis of the "race question" in mid-nineteenth-century America. Ethnologists gleefully waged war against the parsons, and yet worked in constant fear of the parsons' very real cultural power. Sometimes happy in their roles as martyrs to "truth," these scientists were continually frustrated by the power of the Church.12 And in terms of the larger argument over slavery, the power of religion functioned in anything but a straight line. As William Stanton has argued, in the days before the Civil War, the South's religious dogmatism denied it a scientific justification for its slave-holding. '3 Had southern plantation owners fully accepted the theory of polygenesis, their argument in favor of slavery could have been supported by the cold "facts" of science. But to accept these facts would have meant to deny the literal truth of the Genesis story, and, in the long run, the South's refusal to do so denied it very little.
For if science offered one way of supporting the enslavement of blacks, religion, if examined in the "proper light," could offer another.
What the South lost in its reluctance to embrace new scientific "evidence" of racial difference and so-called black inferiority, it made up for in the stories of the Bible, where one could find such rich nuggets as Noah's strange curse on Canaan, the Flood, the destruction of Sodom, and other stories of Biblical apocalypse. In the often surreal narratives of nineteenth-century Biblical scholarship, these stories, with all their misreadings, bear the brunt of supporting the anti-black, pro-slavery theorists in their theo-political quest for racial purity.
But it was not just to Canaan and his troubled family that these theorists turned for their evidence of black inferiority. Rather, they started "in the beginning," at the story of the Fall. From as early as 1860, various writers located their racist polemics in the heart of the to save a slave-ridden and thus destruction-bound nation, these theorists of the Garden constructed their own allegorical entreaty, one that showed the nation on the same path that previously led to the Fall, the Flood, and various plagues by fire and locust. Amalgamation, miscegenation, inter-marriage, integration-these were the contemporary sins that would surely seal the nation's doom.14 In the pages that follow, I will examine a few of the most important moments in this period of Biblical exegesis, paying particular attention to the ways in which the concerns and fears of the post-war South found themselves projected back to the Garden-back to the mysterious relationship between Eve, "our" great white mother, and that darker force, capable of bending her desires to his own. In his efforts to prove that "the Negro" is (and always has been) a beast, Ariel reawakened the controversy over polygenesis, claiming disingenuously that his work had nothing to do with politics. Harrison
Berry, a black respondent to Ariel's work, got to the heart of the matter when he wrote that "it is too apparent to be doubted that the whole fabrication is founded on the interest of the great diabolical slave power, making the enslavement of the Negro justifiable on the hypothesis of his being a beast."'6 Because Ariel's argument figures so prominently in the larger debate, it is worth pausing to summarize its main components: (1) Noah's curse did not make Ham a Negro; (2) since Noah and his wife were both white and "perfect in their genealogy," and since Adam and
Eve were also white, it is impossible that either pair could be "the progenitors of the kinky-headed, black-skinned negroes of this day"; (3) this being the case, the Negro was of necessity created prior to Adam, along with "the other beasts and cattle," and is "a beast in God's nomenclature; and being a beast, was under Adam's rule and dominion, and, like all other beasts or animals, has no soul."7
Ariel's ultimate conclusion is that the tempter in the garden "was a beast, a talking beast" (45 The preadamites were Mongols and Negroes, together with their mixed progeny. Created male and female, and in many pairs, they multiplied rapidly, exterminated the wild beasts, and replenished the earth with beings of their own species, penetrating into every land. (8) Having confirmed the presence of Negroes and Mongols before Adam and Eve, Prospero can brush aside the "superstitious" reading of Genesis in which a serpent tempts Eve, and instead posit that "the tempter was a preadamite, perhaps a negro" (15) . And though this "perhaps" seems to qualify his statement, Prospero's subsequent association of the tempter with a "witch-doctor" all but erases that qualification: the temptation "presents a vivid picture of an African medicine-man, or conjurer, with his 'grey dissimulation,' whispering his diabolical temptation into the ear of unsuspecting Eve" (15) .
Significantly, Prospero eroticizes the scene; the proximity required by the whispering presents a picture of pre-conjugal small talk.
Prospero's account of the temptation is certainly more explicit than Ariel's, but it does not approach the mini-romance sketched by A. and Eve "to control it in common with the rest of the animals" (405).
Instead, "Eve accepted the negress as her counselor, and allowed the negress to control her" (405). The eating of the forbidden fruit was the couple's "second offense"; their first was accepting "the negress as their counselor," an act in which "they necessarily descended to social equality with her" (405-6). This, concludes Carroll, "reveals the startling fact that it was man's social equality with the negro that brought sin into the world" (406).
It is important to remember, however, that this "social equality" is not itself the ultimate sin. Rather, it simply makes possible (or even inevitable) the "most infamous and destructive crime known to the law of God"-amalgamation (406). And it is this possibility that Carroll's regendering of the tempter seeks to avoid, at least at the level of representation. We have seen the anxiety produced by the imaginings of Eve's encounter with a black man in the garden, and we have seen the various narratives that result from this anxiety, ranging from Ariel's relative silence on the issue, to Prospero's more explicit depiction of sexual intercourse. Carroll avoids the imputations on Eve's chastity by substituting a cunning black woman for the over-sexed black man.
Blackness still stands in for seductive evil, but the terms of the seduction, and thus its meaning, have been changed.
Carroll's decision to include a visual representation of the temptation scene (see fig. 1 With the Southern white man, any mesalliance existing between a white woman and a colored man is a sufficient foundation for the charge of rape.
The Southern white man says that it is impossible for a voluntary alliance to exist between a white woman and colored man, and therefore, the fact of an alliance is a proof of force. 44 This suggestively returns us to the illustration included in Carroll's work. What are the real dynamics at work there? We begin with a black woman offering the fruit of knowledge to a white woman. If we emphasize the sameness of gender rather than the difference of race, we can see this moment as a potential feminist alliance that transgresses racial boundaries. The fruit of knowledge which the tempter offers suggests an entrance into the kind of public activism exemplified so clearly by Wells. We hear echoes of Carroll's fear in his disgusted claim that "Eve accepted the negress as her counselor" (405)-"counselor"
signifying not merely a shifted power dynamic, but a new relationship of tutelage. In this reading, Wells brings politics to white women, and the result is an alliance that threatens both patriarchy and white supremacy. 45 In an important sense, however, this fear that Wells's anti-lynching campaign might contaminate white women by inviting them into the political arena was radically misplaced. Carroll appears to be a white man (see fig. 2 ). But given the fact that appearance tells us very little about racial identity-especially as it is defined by the law-this picture cannot be said to solve this puzzle.
Whether Carroll was black, white, or some combination of the two, I
cannot assert with any assurance. And so I want to shift the emphasis from Carroll's identity to his identification, foregrounding the power of whiteness as ideology rather than skin color.54 While a white skin may make the ideology more useful to one, it is not necessary. As a way of seeing, a myth of power, an entire social structure, whiteness works precisely because of our inability to adequately "read" Charles Carroll---our inability to contain him by easy categorization. In contrast to the popular wisdom that whiteness can only exist within a clearly readable, binary structure (a wisdom I want to complicate rather than discredit), I am suggesting that absent such a structure its power actually intensifies in proportion to its invisibility. Unable to locate whiteness in or on the body of Carroll, we are left with the realization that it works best as unattached abstraction, as that which flows through us without staying in any one place for too long. Like a fugitive, it knows to keep moving.
The dilemma that Carroll represents, both as racial ambiguity and theologian, extends far beyond the moment of his writing. Asked to discuss the subject of miscegenation twenty-three years after The 33. It could be argued that the illustration does not de-feminize the tempter so much as it dehumanizes her. In other words, the tempter's difference from the obviously feminine Eve is not a difference of gender, but of species. Carroll, for example, might say that the female beast is not feminine in the same way as the female human. And while this could partially explain the tempter's appearance, the issue of gender should not be allowed to drop out of the equation, since gender does indeed play a role in the imagining of this supposed difference in "species." The tempter's lack of femininity cannot be fully separated from her lack of humanity. Rather, these qualities function in something like a dialectical relationship, where the absence of one contributes to and is reinforced by the absence of the other.
34. This conflation is both obvious and complicated. The notion that blackness is always already gendered male has a lengthy history, and is usually generated, in part, by racist fascination with black male sexuality. But since racist cultures often want things both ways, it is not surprising that blackness, in certain contexts, appears first 37. In fact, Gilman links the corrupting sexuality of black women-specifically the Hottentot-to lesbianism. As Gilman points out, a standard gynecological handbook of the late-nineteenth century suggested that the "Hottentot Apron" (the supposedly deformed labia of the Hottentot) was responsible for the "overdevelopment of the clitoris," which the handbook associates with the "'excesses'" of "'lesbian love'" (237). Though this linkage of black femininity to lesbianism could have intriguing ramifications for my reading of Carroll's temptation scene, I am reluctant to pursue them. While Carroll's tempter corresponds to certain images of the "mannish woman,"
that is, the lesbian, the linkage between black female sexuality and lesbianism which Gilman traces depends upon the physically observable and pathological genitalia of the Hottentot. Since Carroll's tempter does not share the Hottentot's "excessive" physiology, the link from "black female" to "lesbian" in Carroll's illustration is not as obvious as it may first appear.
Esther Newton's influential discussion of the "mannish lesbian" offers another way of introducing lesbian sexuality into a discussion of Carroll's illustration, though here too I am not persuaded that lesbian temptation stands at the center of the picture.
Describing women whose behavior or dress contained "masculine" elements, Newton writes that "from about 1900 on, this cross-gender figure became the public symbol of the new social/sexual category 'lesbian"' (283). As Newton points out, the assumed link between "mannish" behavior and lesbianism can also be found in medical discourse of the late-nineteenth century, particular the writings of influential sexologists Richard von Krafft-Ebing and Havelock Ellis. And yet, neither Newton, KrafftEbing, nor Ellis consider how this linkage between mannishness and lesbianism gets complicated by race--or more specifically, by blackness. While it is safe to assume that mannish representations of bourgeois white women carried associations of lesbian degeneracy (Radclyffe Hall's Stephen Gordon is the most obvious literary example), it does not follow that similarly masculine black women could be read in the same way.
In other words, mannishness in bourgeois white women is seen as degenerate because it represents a fall from a so-called purely feminine state; under the cultural logic of white racism, however, black women had no such state from which to fall in the first 
